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Introduction
Xenotransplantation marks a qualitatively new
challenge in medical technology assessment.
The reasons for this claim are twofold: (i) in
contrast to more traditional medical interven-
tions, xenotransplantation involves risks not
only to the patient, but also to larger segments
of society, thus to public health in general. (ii)
while most medical technologies demand as-
sessment and risk-management at the time
when the technology is sufficiently developed
to be put into practice, xenotransplantation de-
mands pro-active action at a very early stage of
development. 
A particular challenge for any assessment of
xenotransplantation is the inclusion of a satis-
factory approach to the ethical issues involved.
In itself this is, of course, not particular/unique
to xenotransplantation, as most medical inter-
ventions need a good consideration of ethics.
But seen in connection with the two character-
istics mentioned above, this amounts to a truly
formidable task. 
Given that discussions about xenotransplanta-
tion are rather recent, and given that a real sci-
entific development is – luckily I am inclined to
say – still pending and assumedly not to be ex-
pected for several years to come, it is not sur-
prising that the debate about the ethics involved
is still very tentative. Several academic papers
and several government reports from a variety
of countries do indeed deal with the ethical is-
sues of xenotransplantation. But it is, as far as I
can see, still too early to say that a general con-
sensus has been reached about what precisely
the ethical issues are, and, more importantly,
how best to deal with them. What is important,
though, is that the discussion about ethics in
xenotransplantation has started, and that it fol-
lows the medical-scientific advances very
closely. This is in itself a consoling reminder
that ethical awareness in modern societies is
coming more and more to the fore front of pub-
lic debate, and that ethics is put on the agenda,
including the political agenda, like never be-
fore. 
In this paper I shall leave out a number of ethi-
cal issues that need to be dealt with if the ethi-
cal assessment is to be comprehensive. These
are e.g. issues concerning animal welfare and
ethics, issues concerning standard medical
ethics about how to prepare patients for serious
medical interventions, or issues concerning
what could be considered a equitable distribu-
tion of scarce organ resources. With the excep-
tion of animal ethics, none of these seem to be
specific to xenotransplantation. Rather, I shall
concentrate on three salient issues that I deem
to be decisive for any acceptable treatment of
ethical issues with regard to xenotransplanta-
tion. The first issue is the often heard "playing
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God"-argument and variants of it that I shall
discuss critically. The second and most impor-
tant issue is the public health risks, and the
adoption of the Precautionary Principle. I shall
argue for the use of the Precautionary Principle
in this case. The last major theme that shall be
covered in the presentation is the issue of ac-
ceptable decision-making about xenotransplan-
tation. It is argued that a broad initiative to stim-
ulate public debate on the topic is needed in
order to provide for a democratically satisfac-
tory justification for eventual regulation etc. A
wide variety of participatory tools already ex-
ist, and what is lacking, is basically the will and
power commitment of those in charge of public
health policy.
Ethical judgement
Ethics designates the concept of moral judge-
ments in a coherent web of inter-connected
principles. Ethics deals with issues of right or
wrong, good or bad, related to a definite choice
of different options (2, 25). Ethical judgements
fall into one of three categories: morally right,
morally wrong, or morally neutral. For a judge-
ment to be a good moral judgement it takes
three essential ingredients:
i. Sufficient information / knowledge con-
cerning the situation and the options;
ii. Ethical argument or explicit use of ethical
principles; 
iii. Moral competence and skill.
Element (i) relates normally to the inclusion of
good (scientific) expertise. Without knowledge,
or at least the attempt to gather relevant knowl-
edge, no moral judgement can be deemed good.
The second element relates to normative ratio-
nality and the consideration of pro and con ar-
guments, as well as such considerations as con-
sistency, universality etc. The last element
relates to such properties as e.g. empathy and to
view situations from different angles etc. Some
people are better at this than others, but as indi-
vidual competence, it is independent of any
particular theoretical expertise. In other words,
all people have this competence. 
The question then arises, what role ethical the-
ories may play in this? The first thing to realize
is, that there is obviously a multitude of ethical
theories. We differentiate between deontologi-
cal (e.g. Kant) and consequentialist (e.g. Ben-
tham or Mill; utilitarianism) ethical theories,
virtue ethics (Aristotle), justice centred ethical
theories (Rawls; justice as fairness), Christian
ethics versus humanist ethics etc. A theory of
values is not directly identical to any of these
theories, since e.g. utilitarianism is consistent
with a multitude of sets of values, but the exis-
tence of some of these values is always implied
in ethics. Basically, ethics deals with different
concepts of the good life. The problem is, that
there is no obvious candidate among these the-
ories of ethics that a) will provide good answers
to all ethical problems, and that b) people will
agree upon. 
We need, though, to make ethical decisions,
even when not agreeing on a good theory of
ethics, or on the most important ethical princi-
ples. Amazingly, it turns out that, while people
disagree immensely on ethical principles, basic
value, and general ethical outlook, they also
tend to be in much larger agreement when con-
fronted with specific cases of ethical dilemma.
It was, in fact, the most striking experience in
newly established committees on medical
ethics, that they could agree on certain recom-
mendations with a large consensus among
members, while they seemed to disagree as
soon as they were asked to justify their decision
(10; p.16ff). Primary ethical theories remain
thus contested, while concrete and socially ro-
bust judgements seem possible on a much
weaker basis. 
This has led to the development of practical
ethics. One approach is so-called principle-
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based ethics. The idea is to import a number of
ethical principles, and use them isolated from
the rest of their theoretical superstructure for
solving specific dilemmas. One such approach
is the ethical matrix that we shall use further
down. Here it is important to state, if only for
the sake of the argument, that the used princi-
ples represent only an approximation to full-
fledged theories. The claim is that this will
make little practical difference in most cases.
Let us now look closer at xenotransplantation.
Ethical issues in xenotransplantation
I can see three major clusters of ethical issues in
xenotransplantation:
1) Is it at all ethically justifiable to perform
xenotransplantation on a large scale, assum-
ing the technology will ever be available? 
2) Given that xenotransplantation is ethically
justified in principle, is it then also ethically
justified to perform clinical experiments
while scientific uncertainties still appear
large?
3) Are all accompanying measures and strate-
gies that might follow the development and
practice of xenotransplantation (animal ex-
periments with primates, restrictions of per-
sonal freedom after surgery, monitoring of
close relatives or sex-partners, etc.) ethically
justified in themselves?
I shall not deal with 2) and 3) in this paper, but
I shall concentrate on 1), more specifically,
those aspects of 1) that relate to risk (thus
touching on issue 2 after all) and human nature,
excluding e.g. animal welfare. I hope, though,
that the approach suggested here might indicate
how I think that one can deal with other issues
as well. 
There are two aspects of xenotransplantation
that make it a special challenge to ethics, quite
detached from other medical technologies so
far developed. First of all, xenotransplantation
carries with it, not only certain risks to the pa-
tient, but also to some extent risks to public
safety and health. This is due to the theoretical
possibility of zoonosis (in this case more cor-
rectly "xenosis"), i.e. the transferral of virus
from the source organism (where these viruses
may or may not cause disease) to the recipient,
where they eventually may cause viral infec-
tions of the recipient. Of particular concern are
the so-called porcine endogene retrovirus
(PERV) in transferral of pig-cells to humans.
While PERVs are unproblematic for pigs, we do
not know how they will behave in humans, es-
pecially if the possibility of mutation is taken
into account. I shall not expand on this point,
but rather refer to the other contributions in this
volume and to the NOU 2001 (18) (see also 19,
23). Obviously, the absolute worst case scenario
would be one in which PERVs become virulent
with easy transferral of infections between hu-
mans (e.g. drop infections), with a long period
of latency, and eventually fatal outcome. 
The second point why xenotransplantation is a
special challenge to ethical decision making, is
that the uncertainties we are dealing with, are
inherent in the system and not simply a matter
of not having done enough research. While ba-
sic research may carry us a long way with re-
gard to charting the necessary mechanisms for
xenosis and estimating the risk of transferral
from donor to recipient, we are at an impasse
when PERV is transmitted without immediate
negative effects. How long may the virus stay
harmless? And if it turns into something dan-
gerous, what is the period of latency, i.e. how
long do we have to test and monitor the patient
until we can rest assured that no harm is done?
If a system has no resilience to an unknown in-
truder, then the system may be destabilised at
any point without one being able to predict
when this will happen. So is the nature of sys-
tem uncertainties. Wait-and-see is simply no
ethically justifiable course of action. We have to
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make decisions taking explicit account of the
uncertainties, if we want to act ethically.
Before I explain my suggestion of how to deal
with this challenge, let me sketch some argu-
ments that have been put forward as an answer
to these challenges, but that do not carry us
very far.
The "Playing God-argument" and other 
objections
There is the argument that one should refrain
from xenotransplantation altogether because
xenotransplantation breaks down some "God-
given" boundaries between man and animals. In
so doing, we effectively re-shuffle the order of
nature as intended by God, thus assuming the
same status as God the creator. A divine order
should not be tampered with, and consequences
can only be disastrous. Interestingly, even an
atheist may cling to a version of this argument,
replacing God with some notion of Nature (but
implicitly assuming that Nature has something
like intentions). 
Even though this argument is sometimes dis-
played in political debates, it is seldom de-
fended by ethicists or theologians. I think the
reasons are obvious: the argument is just not
good enough. It is in flagrant violation of a
whole lot of practices that we assumedly con-
sider ethically well justified. We may mention
allotransplantation, of course (i.e. the breaking
down of the "divine order" between individu-
als), but also such innocent practices as animal
breeding or agriculture. If we violate a divine
order by transferring a pig cell from a pig to a
human, then we also violate this same order
when we cross Brussel-sprouts with cauli-
flower, or when we breed gold-fish with dys-
functional tail-fins. 
One may counter this objection by claiming
that the argument is not really an absolute argu-
ment, but basically an argument of the "slip-
pery-slope" kind. Most people seem to agree
that we do not necessarily need to let nature
take its course, without us interfering and recti-
fying developments that we deem negative.
Thus, on the one hand, nature is not "holy" (the
"divine order" is not an absolute). On the other
hand, most people seem also to agree that if we
ourselves or the nature around us would be the
sole result of human designs, then we have per-
verted the very core of our existence. The posi-
tive design of humans, for instance, is judged
ethically unacceptable, since chance and acci-
dent is seen as a basic feature of the human con-
dition, making for the uniqueness of each and
every individual. So we have the positive design
at the bottom and the repair option at the top.
While the top end is unproblematic, the bottom
is deemed ethically highly problematic. If we
move too much away from the top, we might
slide all the way down. Xenotransplantation
might just be that kind of move, since we utilise
other living beings for the benefit of humans in
a hitherto unprecedented manner. 
The problem with that kind of argument is that
it rests on unrealistic premises. There is always
change, we cannot stand still in history, and we
are certainly not placed on a singular moral
slope. Rather, we are always facing dilemmas
of having to make trade-offs between various
considerations, many of them highly ethically
relevant, too. In this landscape we have no use
for one-dimensional maps, we need multi-di-
mensional charts of our immediate surround-
ings. 
There is still another version of the argument
that one may try here. It runs as follows: we un-
dermine both our and nature's inherent value if
everything is treated instrumentally, e.g. pig or-
gans. When we start to farm pigs for the sole
purpose of harvesting their organs, we not only
show disregard for the animal's dignity, but in
effect we ourselves have become perverted in
the very nature of our humanity ("doing this to
others just shows what has become of you!").
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This is an extension and variation of the well-
known Kantian categorical imperative, and it
rests on essentialism. 
I have some sympathy for this argument, if only
as a reminder that we are but a minute part of
the whole of nature. The problem with this ar-
gument in our connection is similar to the pre-
vious one: as long as we do not have a positive
specification of what is an ethically legitimate
instrumentalisation of nature and what is not, it
does not help us much. Faced with the choice of
saving a human being from certain death, and
instrumentalising some colonies of pigs, the
balance of moral consideration might go in
favour of the human being. After all, it does so
in meat production. 
There may be other arguments that one might
bring to the fore front against xenotransplanta-
tion as a principal option for health technolo-
gies. Some of them are surely non-starters, as
e.g. the zero-risk argument: only under full cer-
tainty and with zero risk to public health should
we engage in xenotransplantation. But: there is
never any zero-risk in anything we engage in,
and avoiding all risks at any price leads to ethi-
cally unacceptable costs under scarce re-
sources. 
Thus, all in all, I am inclined to say that seem-
ingly there is no real ethical knock-down argu-
ment against the very possibility of performing
xenotransplantation as a routine treatment.
There are, on the other hand, good moral rea-
sons why xenotransplantation should be on our
agenda of medical interventions, namely the
life of a great number of patients. This is not to
say that we should go ahead without moral re-
straint in developing this technology. In fact, I
believe there are good reasons why restraint is
indicated. The restraint has to do with the
morally acceptable way of managing the risks
(uncertainties) involved. The key term here is
precaution.
The Precautionary Principle in medical
technology
The Precautionary Principle (hereafter: PP)
was first developed to manage environmental
risks of various kinds. It is integrated in various
national laws and international treaties. Re-
cently it has been extended to other uses as e.g.
industrial safety and public health via consider-
ations of the safety of food (gm-food in partic-
ular). PP is still debated in science, since it has
no unique definition, and it is (thus) hard to op-
erationalise in practise. Politically PP is also
challenged by the US, against the insistence of
the EU, that it is not a hindrance of technologi-
cal progress, nor a new trade barrier (e.g. in the
WTO). The Nordic countries largely seem to
accept the PP as a sensible instrument of policy
making in the realm of uncertainty. I shall not
dwell on the discussions about the PP (see e.g.
6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24), but as-
sume that some consensus on its basic sub-
stance can be reached. Is it, then, sensible to ap-
ply the PP in the case of xenotransplantation?
One may differentiate between three major
steps when utilising the PP: 1) Under what con-
ditions do we need to apply the PP at all? 2) If
the PP is applied, what precautionary strategies
should be chosen? 3) Given that parts of the de-
liberations are sensitive to value issues, how is
the decision process on the PP to take place in a
democratic society? 
NENT (The National Committee for Research
Ethics in Science and Technology (in Norway)
(17) has specified certain conditions for when
to apply the PP. They are:
• there exist considerable scientific uncertain-
ties;
• there exist scenarios (or models) of possible
harm that are scientifically reasonable (i.e.
based on some scientifically acceptable rea-
soning);
• uncertainties cannot be reduced without at
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the same time increasing ignorance of other
relevant factors;
• the potential harm is sufficiently serious or
even irreversible for present or future gener-
ations; 
• if one delays action now, effective counter-
action will later be made more difficult.
I shall attempt to provide a detailed argument
why xenotransplantation can indeed be said to
fulfil these conditions. Again I refer to the NOU
2001 (18) for further details. But the conclusion
is, that all of these conditions seem to hold for
the case of xenotransplantation. There are, as
we have observed in the beginning, major sys-
tem uncertainties involved, related to the trans-
ferral of PERVs and their potential for causing
infections in humans. There is also a scientific
basis for a harm scenario of this kind, e.g. the
development of HIV by zoonosis from primates
to humans. The potential harm may be very
great, immediately or at a later point of time.
And we do not have ways to effectively reduce
the uncertainties, other than trying it out in
practice. Any model situation in a laboratory
only raises the question whether the model re-
captures the reality. But unless we take some
precautionary measures in time, we might not
be able to do so once the problem has materi-
alised. Hence, I conclude that there is sufficient
reason to apply the PP in the case of xenotrans-
plantation. 
What then are the precautionary strategies that
one might want to implement as a conse-
quence? A precautionary strategy can be de-
fined as any measure that can be believed to ef-
fectively reduce either the risk of the harm
itself, or the magnitude and spreading of the
harm, should it occur. The NOU 2001 (18) on
xenotransplantation discusses a number of pos-
sible strategies: a moratorium, a step-by-step
and a case-by-case strategy, restrictions of uses
to small and strictly monitored groups, and the
international cooperation in monitoring the pa-
tients (and their families). The first is the
strictest and the last is the most liberal, i.e. least
effective strategy. As tempting as a moratorium
may look from a societal point of view, it should
be kept in mind that it only delays the problem.
It might actually backfire, given that not all
countries might implement a moratorium and
that diseases know no borders. What one even-
tually wants to achieve is enough knowledge
and a strong institutional apparatus to contain
the possible harm should it materialise, but still
allowing the technology to develop for the ben-
efits of patients. 
This then brings us to the question of who is to
make the relevant decisions, and how is this to
be done? Obviously, since value issues are at
stake here, and since people have different de-
grees of willingness to take risks, a wide public
consultation is indicated, especially in lively
and modern democracies. Many individuals
(e.g. 1) and several government reports have
stressed the need of this public consultation
(18). Canada has begun a process with public
consultations on this issue (4). One of the diffi-
cult issues is how to make sure that the ethical
viewpoints come out appropriately in these
public consultations. Here, I suggest to con-
sider the method of ethical matrix. 
An ethical matrix on xenotransplantation -
a tentative suggestion
An ethical matrix is a scheme that specifies and
interprets selected and acknowledged ethical
principals according to every stakeholder's
viewpoint. The approach originated first in
Beauchamp and Childress (3) for medical
ethics, and was then further developed for
biotechnological issues by Ben Mepham (15,
16), and modified by Kaiser and Forsberg (14;
also 5). 
The basic idea is to collect the basic ethical
principles guiding our decision-making along
one dimension, and to specify all the ethical
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stakeholders along another dimension. The first
step, then, is to provide detailed specifications
of the ethical principles for all stakeholders and
all principles. For instance, given that one in-
cludes the principle of justice, and uses only
two stakeholders, patients and families. In the
case of xenotransplantation one could venture
that justice from the patient's point of view
amounts to the fair distribution of available
transplant organs, while seen from the families'
point of view, it could mean that their lives are
not unduly and unnecessarily restricted because
of one family-member's operation. It is quite
easy to see that many ethical principles will
lead to diverging specifications for different
stakeholders. All the cells being columns under
all principles, and rows next to all stakeholders,
need to be filled in.
The next step is to consider how a given action,
in this case a technology, will affect the ethical
considerations in each cell. A given action
might diminish the chances of the consideration
under discussion, it might increase them, or it
may be neutral to them. This is called the con-
sequence matrix, consisting basically of "+", "-
" and "0"-marks in each cell. Alternatively, the
relevant consequences could be spelled out in
more detail. 
In a final step one then needs to evaluate the to-
tality of all the relevant considerations. This
evaluation is not something that can be deduced
from the matrix itself, but needs the considered
judgement of those engaging in the exercise.
The value of the ethical matrix lies in its feature
of making the ethically relevant aspects of the
choice transparent to all involved parties and
structuring their debate. It is not an algorithm
for decision making. 
There is a real issue on the number and nature
of the ethical principles that are used. I shall not
enter this debate here, but only indicate that we
found it useful to operate with the three princi-
ples justice (as fair distributions), dignity (in-
cluding autonomy for human subjects) and wel-
fare (including measurable benefits like
economy, but being restricted to them). My sug-
gestion would be to regard the ethical matrix as
a practical tool for a process of public consulta-
tions on xenotransplantation. It could help fo-
cus the deliberations on the ethical issues and
provide understanding for the different consid-
erations that need to be taken into account. It is
still an open-ended process, since it does not
prescribe any particular final judgements. 
As a start-up ethical matrix one might want to
consider something along the following lines: 
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justice dignity welfare
pasient Equal changes Informed consent Improved
/fair access to organs quiality of life
family No unneccesary Informed consent Improved
restrictions to private on restrictions quality of life
lives in family
society No unvoluntary Consultation / Improved
risks information / public health
democracy Acceptable costs
future No inheritance Possibility of Good public
generations of non natural risks reversal health
animals Compensated Respect of No pain
for loss of wild life basic needs
The second step is then to ask what xenotrans-
plantation would do to any of the concerns ex-
pressed in the above matrix. Here one may ob-
viously deal with a large number of relevant
consequences, and some of the consequences
will be uncertain, so that their estimated proba-
bility might come into play. But roughly, one
could venture consequences of the following
kind (that need to be evaluated in respect to the
principles):
I shall refrain from any attempt to specify in de-
tail how each consequence affects the ethical
concerns of the first matrix. 
My argument here is not to defend the specifics
of the ethical matrices outlined above. They
serve merely as an illustration of what could be
the structure of a public consultation process on
xenotransplantation. They cannot replace that
process. But the basic point is that there are in-
deed "tools" of participatory and ethical deci-
sion making at hand, that could be utilised in a
public consultation process, and that might in-
deed be useful tools in that process. And in the
above sections I tried to show that the nature of
the issues in xenotransplantation is such that we
cannot avoid a public consultation.
Conclusion
This paper argued that the novel features of
xenotransplantation set it apart from the tradi-
tional ethical evaluations of other medical tech-
nologies. The systems uncertainties, the risks,
and the need for pro-active deliberations and
actions requires special ethical attention. While
I rejected most of the arguments that sometimes
are put forward to question the very legitimacy
of xenotransplantation from an ethical point of
view, I argued that the Precautionary Principle
offers the most relevant guidance in this case.
Basically, all the conditions needed to apply
this principle can be assumed to hold, and, fur-
thermore, several precautionary measures are
available. The real crux is then the decision
making process in this case. Since the value is-
sues are so central, since risks are judged dif-
ferently by different people, and since interests
may clash between different groups, a partici-
patory process is indicated. In the final section
I suggested that the method of ethical matrix be
used to help structure this public consultation. 
Ethics is not a discipline of expertise as any
other part of science and scholarship. It has its
basis in the moral judgements that everybody
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justice dignity welfare
pasient More transplants Consent may Survival, even with
change over time acceptable quality
of life
family No or few unreasonable Loss of motivation Improved quality
constraints to uphold strict in family, but also
(uncertain) regime over time additional strain
society Unvoluntary and Some groups Uncertain net-effect
large risks principally opposed in health economy
future Unvoluntary risks Practically Strain on their
generations inherited irreversible risks health economy
possible?
animals Some Limited satisfaction Pain and
compensation of basic needs, suffering
artificial environment
makes to a larger or lesser extent in daily life.
But there are constraints and conceptual frame-
works in ethics that help people make better
ethical judgements. The challenge in the case of
xenotransplantation is to utilise these con-
straints and frameworks in a process of building
consensus on the restrained, careful and precau-
tionary development of a public policy for
xenotransplantation. The earlier this process
starts the better. We cannot wait until the tech-
nology is fully developed. 
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